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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
vs.
DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.

13137

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appellant, David Craig Carlsen, appeals from his conviction of attempted second degree burglary in the First
Judicial District Court of the County of Cache, State of
Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On the 25th day of September, 1972, appellant was
brought to a jury trial for the crime of attempted burglary of which the jury rendered a verdict of guilty. The
court, on the 26th day of September, 1972, imposed judgment and sentence and a commitment was issued ordering appellant to be confined in the Utah State Prison for
a term of not less than six months nor more than ten
years.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits that the judgment of the
First Judicial District Court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the 11th day of April, 1972, the appellant, while
on parole from the Utah State Prison, was observed, along
with one other person, purchasing burglary tools from the
Grand Central Store in Logan, Utah. That night the
appellant and his companion were surprised while trying
to break into the Rexall Drug Store in Richmond, Utah,
by two police officers. The appellant then fled on foot,
but not before being recognized by one of the officers who
had known him for a number of years previously (T. 3132). The appellant eluded the officers, but his companion
was apprehended. The appellant was arrested the next
day in Logan, Utah.
An information was filed in the District Court on the
5th day of June. At a hearing on August 17, appellant's
counsel requested a trial date in the latter part of September. Trial was held on the 25th and 26th of September, and the jury rendered a verdict of guilty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION
BEYOND NINETY DAYS FROM THE FILING OF AN INFORMATION AND DID NOT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ERR IN CONVICTING AND SENTENCING
APPELLANT, IN THAT PURSUANT TO
UTAH CODE ANN. SEC. 77-65-1 (SUPP.
1971), THE COURT GRANTED A NECESSARY AND REASONABLE CONTINUANCE
FOR GOOD CAUSE.
The issue in case at bar falls within the Utah Detainer Act which provides in part:
"Whenever a person has entered upon a term
of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of this state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is
pending in this state any untried indictment, information or complaint against the prisoner, he
shall be brought to trial within ninety days after
he shall have caused to be delivered to the county
attorney of the county in which the indictment,
information or complaint is pending and the appropriate court written notice of the place of his
imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or
complaint: provided, that for a good cause shown
in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being
present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance . . ." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 77-65-1 (a)
(Supp. 1971). (Emphasis added.)
This court in interpreting this statute stated, "We
think the State has ninety days from notice after an information or indictment has been filed in which to bring
the defendant to trial in a felony case." State v. Clark,
28 Utah 2d 272, 501 P. 2d 274 (1972).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In the present case, the information was filed on the
5th day of June. The following conversation between
appellant's attorney and the trial judge at a hearing held
August 17th (within the 90 day period) explains why the
trial was held beyond the 90 day period.
THE COURT: All right, then I can set it for
September 14th and 15th. Does that give you
enough time to treat those motions, do you think?
MR. LONG: Well, it probably would, your
Honor, except for the fact that I don't plan to be
here during the month of September. I don't plan
to be anywhere in Utah during that month, although it may happen that I am. Is it possible
to set it later in the month of September? I mean
if it is close to the first of October and still in
September, I can come back a little early to do
that. If it is set in say the next couple of weeks,
I will be hard put to prepare my motions.
THE COURT: What you are asking is something in the last two weeks in September?
MR. LONG: Yes.
In a case whose facts are very similar to the circumstances presented here, this court stated,
"It was at the request of, and in order to accommodate the defendant's counsel, (with the defendant at his side) that he not be forced to trial
on the 28th when he had another commitment,
that the trial court indicated a setting for February 9th, just five days beyond the 90 day period,
which was agreed to by the defense inasmuch as
this occurrence took place within the 90 day period, the court certainly then had jurisdiction of
the matter in which the statute says that it 'may
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.'
The order made was within the authority of the
court, and was entirely reasonable and practical
under the circumstances/' State v. Bonny, 25
Utah 2d 117, 477 P. 2d 147 (1970).
In the present case the alleged delay beyond the 90
day period was also due to an effort by the trial court to
accommodate defendant's counsel. As shown by the conversation recorded at the August 17th hearing, appellant's
counsel was "hard put" to prepare his motions within the
90 day period and he therefore asked for a trial date in
the last two weeks of September.
At the time of the August 17th hearing the trial court
did have jurisdiction of the matter and for good cause
shown in open court granted a reasonable continuance.
The purpose of the statute is "to more precisely define what is meant by 'speedy trial' as that term is used
in the constitutions of the various states." State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P. 2d 158 (1969).
The United States Supreme Court:
". . . has consistently been of the view that 'the
right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does
not preclude the rights of public justice.' (citation
omitted.) 'Whether delay in completing a prosecution . . . amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends ^upon the circumstances
. . . The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive.' (citation omitted.) ' (T) he essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed.'"
United States v. Ewell, 383 U. S. 116, 120 (1966).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The reasoning of the United States Supreme Court
concerning speedy trial may be applied to the case at bar.
Circumstances justified continuance; appellant's counsel
was unable to prepare his motions within the 90 day period nor even 11 days after this period had expired. Much
of the delay during the 90 day period was caused by the
actions of the appellant. Numerous motions were filed
by the appellant which took time to be heard and which
necessitated the trial court in getting another judge to
determine the matters set out in these motions and to
try the case (T. 7). Arraignment of the appellant had
to be postponed at his own request resulting in further
delay (R. 34).
Due to these actions and at the request of appellant's
counsel, the trial was justifiably held beyond the 90 day
period. No rights of appellant were prejudiced. The delay was not purposeful or oppressive. There was orderly
expedition. The facts fall well within the constitutional
standard of right to a speedy trial, the Utah statute, and
do not fall contrary to Utah case law. The respondent
submits that the trial court did have jurisdiction at the
time it passed judgment and the conviction of the appellant should, therefore, be affirmed.
POINT II.
THE RECORD IN THE PRESENT CASE
PRESENTS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
S U P P O R T THE CONVICTION OF THE
APPELLANT.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Counsel for the appellant contends that the prosecution did not carry its burden of proof in showing intent on
the part of the appellant. As this court pointed out in
State of Utah v. Peterson, 22 Utah 2d 377, 453 P. 2d 697
(1969), a person is presumed to intend the natural and
probable consequences of his acts.
Appellant would contend that the prosecution must
show by absolute proof that appellant had specific intent
to commit larceny. Such a burden is not required. This
court stated in State v. Hopkins, 11 Utah 2d 363, 359 P.
2d 486 (1961).
"Even though there was no direct proof that
defendant entered an apartment with intent to
commit larceny, evidence that he entered the
apartment by a ladder at night and fled when
police officers arrived, coupled with other inculpatory conduct, provided ample proof to support conviction."
In the present case, evidence was presented that the
appellant was attempting to forcibly enter the Rexall
Drug Store at night. When the police officers arrived, the
appellant fled on foot, after being recognized. Another
suspect who was apprehended at that time was seen
earlier in the day with the appellant purchasing tools of
the type used in the attempted break-in. The jury chose
to believe the evidence presented by the prosecution
which was definitely sufficient to support a conviction.
The respondent submits that no error was committed
by the trial court in not directing a verdict for the appelDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lant or in not directing a verdict to a lesser and lower
degree of the crime.
POINT III.
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS AS TO THE
A L L E G E D ADMISSION OF IMPROPER
EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED
INASMUCH AS TIMELY OBJECTION WAS
NOT MADE.
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that:
"A verdict of finding shall not be set aside, nor
shall the judgment or decision based thereon be
reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of
evidence unless (a) there appears of record objection to the evidence timely interposed and so
stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection, and (b) the court which passes upon the
effect of the error or errors is of the opinion that
the admitted evidence should have been excluded
on the ground stated and probably had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict or
finding."
In the present case, no objection was made to the
alleged improper evidence during the course of the trial.
It was not until six days after the conclusion of the trial
that appellant's counsel submitted an exception to certain
testimony given (R. 73).
This court stated in Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261,
332 P. 2d 981 (1958):
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Whatever merit there may have been to this
objection, the defendant is now precluded from
voicing it. The testimony was elicited without
objection. This constituted a waiver of the right
to question its competency. And the evidence being so received could be relied upon as proof of
the fact to which it related."
53 Am. Jur. sec. 134, in discussing the requirement
of timeliness, stated:
"The time for presenting questions as to the
applicability of evidence, both as to issues and
parties, is at the time when the evidence is offered,
if it is reasonably possible to present the objection
at that time; unless such reasonable objections are
made the party cannot as of right insist upon his
objections by means of motions to strike out evidence or requests for rulings after the close of the
evidence."
The appellant in case at bar did not timely object to
the evidence offered and should therefore be precluded
from raising these issues before this court.
Even if timely objection had been made, the effect of
the testimony elicited did not have a substantial influence
in bringing about the verdict rendered and, therefore, such
verdict should not be set aside nor the judgment based
thereon be reversed.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
CHANGE OF VENUE.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is a well settled proposition in Utah case law that
a change of venue is within the trial court's judicial discretion and subject to review only for abuse of such discretion. In appellate review of the exercise of this discretion, the appellant must satisfy the Supreme Court that
the trial court exercised its discretion clearly against reason and evidence. The respondent submits that the
appellant has failed to show that the trial court exercised
such abuse. State v. BeBee, 110 Utah 484, 175 P. 2d 478
(1946); State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 P. 563 (1924).
Section 77-26-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), in prescribing an application for change of venue states that:
"The application must be made in open court,
and in writing supported by affidavit, and may be
made at any time before trial upon reasonable
notice and the service of copies of the application
and affidavits upon the attorney for the state."
In discussing statutes of this sort 56 Am. Jur. Sec.
61, states that:
"Where a reasonable previous notice of the
application is provided for, the only fair deduction
to be made from that provision is that the notice
must precede the commencement of the trial."
In the present case the attorney for appellant did
not present his motion for Change of Venue until after
the trial had commenced (T. 9). The appellant himself
had presented this motion earlier but subsequently withdrew it. The trial judge later invited the appellant's attorney to reassert the motion and was told that if it were
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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done it would be in advance of the trial date. When the
motion was presented at the trial, the trial judge decided
not to entertain it as it had not been timely brought (T.
9-10),
The record indicates that the appellant did not comply with the statute as to reasonable notice and, therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding not to entertain the motion.
CONCLUSION
The respondent submits that the trial court did have
jurisdiction of the information and did not commit any
errors which would require a reversal of the conviction
below. The State asks that the judgment be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Chief Assistant Attorney General
WILLIAM T. EVANS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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